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"No government interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation."1
"Security is like liberty in that many are the crimes committed in its name."2
 
 The structure of the United States federal court system can be considered common 
knowledge: the Supreme Court sits atop a pyramid of lower circuit courts and trial courts, 
all of which are, for the most part, open to the public. Until 2002, most Americans were 
unaware of the existence of a "secret" court whose sole duty is to review and approve 
applications authorizing foreign intelligence surveillance conducted by the Executive 
Branch.  The year 2002 was an unprecedented year for the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court ("FISC"),3 and the statute that created it, the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 ("FISA").4  For the first time in FISA's twenty-three year 
history, FISC denied an application for electronic surveillance and the Foreign 
                                                 
1 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1980). 
2 Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551 (1950). 
3 See 50 U.S.C. §1803(a) (2002).  The FISC is created under this statutory provision.  The judges that sit on 
FISC are eleven district court judges from seven of the United States judicial circuits appointed by the 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.  Id.  Prior to the amendment of FISA by the USA PATRIOT Act , the 
FISC consisted of seven judges. Pub. L. No. 107-56, Title II, § 208, 115 Stat. 283 (2001).   
4 See 50 U.S.C. §§1801- 1862 (2002). 
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Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review ("Court of Review") was convened to hear its 
first appeal.5   
 Before 2002, FISC was shrouded in a cloud of mystery.  No one knew the identity 
of the presiding judges6 and few paid attention to any of its activities.  Under the 
language of FISA, all proceedings in front of the court, applications made to the court, 
and orders of the court are guarded under strict security measures.7  All proceedings 
regarding FISA orders are completely ex parte.8   Any evidence gathered in the course of 
foreign intelligence surveillance authorized under FISA is usually unavailable for the 
review of the defendant at his criminal trial.9   
FISC was called the "rubberstamp court" by those who were paying attention to 
its activities,10 a nickname it fully earned because in its twenty-three year existence it had 
never once turned down an application by the Executive Branch requesting foreign 
intelligence surveillance.11  The fact that FISC "rubberstamped" all these applications 
became especially troublesome when, in 2002, the Justice Department admitted to FISC 
                                                 
5 In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Court of Review, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 620 
(Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. 2002); see also 50 U.S.C. §1803(b) (2002). The Court of Review is convened by 
operation of this statute and consists of three federal district court or court of appeals judges appointed by 
the Chief Justice. See id. 
6  FAS: Judges of the Foreign Intelligence Courts available at 
http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/court2002.html (made the identities of the judges sitting upon the court in 
2002 common public knowledge); See also 50 U.S.C. §1803 (2002). 
7 50 U.S.C. §1803(c) (2002). 
8 Id. § 1806(f). 
9 Id.  
10 See id. at § 1807.  FISA requires the Attorney General to submit a report each year to the Administrative 
Office of the US Courts, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the 
Senate detailing the number of applications from the FBI and NSA requesting surveillance/and or physical 
searches, the number of orders approved and the number of applications modified or denied by the FISC.  
Id.   See also, FAS: "Annual Reports," available at http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ (provides copies of all 
such reports between 1979 and 2000). 
11 The “Secret Court,” at http://www.courts.net/secret.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2003)  (“Various reports 
have suggested that anywhere from 7,500 to 10,000 applications had been submitted, without a single 
denial, from 1978 until May 2002.”); See also Federation of American Scientists: Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act at http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/; Patrick S. Poole: Inside America’s Secret Court: The 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, at http://fly.hiwaay.net/~pspoole/fiscshort.html.  
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that it knew of at least seventy-five instances where it provided false or misleading 
information in order to obtain approval for surveillance.12  Within the context of this 
admission and the growing concerns of civil libertarians in the wake of September 11th, 
in an unprecedented action on May 17, 2002, FISC denied a motion from Attorney 
General John Ashcroft laying out new procedures for pursuing foreign intelligence 
surveillance and issued an order modifying those procedures.13 The May 2002 opinion, In 
re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Court of Review, was the first time 
that the court had refused to authorize a search or surveillance as requested by the Justice 
Department.  With the ensuing appeal of this decision the public was, for the first time, 
granted a clear glimpse into the inner-workings of FISA and the FISA courts.14  This was 
the first time that any information had been publicly disseminated about the FISA Courts 
and its decisions. The Matters opinion was released by the chairman of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, with the concurrence of the Chief Judge of the Court.15  The public 
was given access to not only the Department of Justice's ("DOJ") appellate briefs, the 
amicus curiae briefs from the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") and the 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL"), but the public was 
allowed to read a decision of FISC, and the first decision of the Court of Review.  This 
unprecedented activity thrust FISC and FISA into the limelight and has revived an old 
                                                 
12 Matters, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 620.  See also Letter from William D. Delahunt, House Representative from 
Massachusetts, to Robert S. Mueller, Director of the FBI (June 14, 2002), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/del061402.pdf; Letter from M.E. Bowman, Deputy General Counsel 
for National Security Affairs, Office of the General Counsel, to Congressman William Delahunt (August 7, 
2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ec.pdf. 
13 Matters, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 625-27.  
14 See In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).  Sealed Case is the 
appeal of FISC's decision in Matters approving the two surveillance applications, but ordering that the 
government conduct the surveillance under modified minimization procedures. Id. at 720.  
15 The “Secret Court,” at http://www.courts.net/secret.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2003). 
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debate on the freedom the Executive Branch should be given to pursue surveillance in the 
name of "national security."  
  This Note will analyze the landmark first appellate decision issued by the Court 
of Review, In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, with regard to the history of foreign 
intelligence surveillance and the importance of the civil liberty questions raised by the 
relaxed Fourth Amendment standards that FISA allows.  The Court of Review's decision 
attempts to resolve two contentious issues surrounding FISA.  The first issue concerns the 
statutory interpretation of the limits of foreign intelligence electronic surveillance under 
FISA.  The federal courts, Congress, and the DOJ have all come up with differing 
interpretations over time of what the limits of the foreign intelligence warrant exception 
should be.  Adding to the confusion over the interpretation of FISA, the United States 
Congress amended two critical FISA provisions as part of its "Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
Act of 2001" (The USA PATRIOT Act)16 (hereinafter "Patriot Act").  In its Sealed 
Decision case, the Court of Review attempts to settle these questions of statutory 
interpretation, taking into account the new amendments. 
 After resolving that issue, the Court of Review then examines the constitutionality 
of FISA, reconciling its lower procedural requirements for electronic surveillance with 
the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure prescriptions.  The constitutionality of 
FISA's lower probable cause standards and allowance for in camera, ex parte 
proceedings were fervently contested by amicus briefs supplied by the ACLU17 and the 
                                                 
16 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
17 Brief for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717 
(Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (No. 02-001), available at 
http://archive.aclu.org/court/091902FISCRbrief.pdf. [hereinafter ACLU Br.]. The ACLU brief was joined 
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NACDL.18  The Court of Review cautiously analyzes the Fourth Amendment concerns 
that surround electronic surveillance in the name of national security, and through a well-
drafted analysis, helps to put to some of them to rest.  
 Before analyzing the Court of Review's decision, part I of this Note will provide a 
general explanation of the history leading up to the passage of FISA, FISA's statutory 
provisions, and the FISA application process.  Part II will provide analysis of the first 
issue in the appeal to the Court of Review, the dichotomy between criminal prosecution 
objectives and foreign intelligence purposes.  Part III will analyze the constitutionality of 
FISA.  Finally, the Note will conclude with what the future holds in the arena of foreign 
intelligence electronic surveillance in light of the Court of Review's rulings.  
 
Part I:  The History and the Structure of FISA 
A. Background and History 
 [E]very President since Franklin Delano Roosevelt has claimed the 
'inherent' constitutional power to authorize warrantless surveillance in 
cases vitally affecting the national security.  Furthermore, all presidents to 
hold office since Katz was decided have advocated a broad exception to 
the warrant requirement for surveillance target at agents of foreign 
governments.19
 
Since its inception, the Executive Branch's evoking of this "national security" exception 
to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment has been problematic.  In order to 
address many problems raised by electronic surveillance for general criminal surveillance 
the Congress first enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
                                                                                                                                                 
by the Center for Democracy and Technology, Center for National Security Studies, Electronic Privacy 
Information Center, and Electronic Frontier Foundation. Id. 
18 Brief of Amicus Curiae, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, In re Sealed Case No. 02-
001, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (No. 02-001), available at 
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/FISCR/20020927_nacdl_fisa_amicus.html. [hereinafter NACDL 
Br.]. 
19 Chagon v. Bell, 642 F.2d 1248, 1259-60 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
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("Title III")20 in 1968, which prohibits most warrantless electronic surveillance.  
However, as originally drafted, Title III explicitly stated that it did not apply to or 
regulate surveillance in the name of national security.21  In a series of opinions in the 
1970s, the federal courts molded the concept of a national security exception to the 
warrant requirement, giving great deference to the Executive Branch’s assertions that this 
particular type of surveillance was needed to protect national security.   
 In a case deciding the fate of civil rights leader, H. Rap Brown, the Fifth Circuit 
decided that a number of conversations between Brown and his lawyer, which were 
overheard through warrantless wiretapping, were, though irrelevant to the criminal 
conviction at hand, legally obtained through the foreign intelligence exception.22  The 
court affirmed that the President has a "constitutional duty to act for the United States in 
the field of foreign relations, and . . . inherent power to protect national security in the 
context of foreign affairs . . . Restrictions . . . which are appropriate in cases of domestic 
security become artificial in the context of the international sphere."23
 In United States v. Butenko, a Soviet national and an American citizen appealed 
their conviction for transmitting to a foreign government materials and information 
relating to the national defense.24  The Third Circuit accepted the lower court's decision 
that the surveillance was within the power of the Executive Branch, as it was mostly 
designed to determine the leak of the sensitive information concerning foreign policy and 
                                                 
20 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000). 
21 Id. § 2511(3) (1968) ("Nothing contained in this chapter . . . shall limit the constitutional power of the 
President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential 
attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential 
to the security of the United States, or to protect national security information against foreign intelligence 
activities").  This provision was deleted with the passage of FISA and replaced by language referencing 
FISA's procedures for gathering foreign intelligence information. Id. § 2511(2)(f) (2000).  
22 United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973). 
23 Id. 
24 494 F.2d 595, 596-97 (3d Cir. 1974).  
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military posture.  The court endorsed the foreign intelligence warrant exception by 
stating: 
While we acknowledge that requiring prior approval of electronic 
surveillance . . . might have some salutary effects . . . the better course is 
to rely . . . on the good faith of the Executive . . . [A] strong public interest 
exists: the efficient operation of the Executive's foreign policy-making 
apparatus depends on a continuous flow of information.25
  
 Giving the Executive Branch wide latitude to conduct electronic surveillance in 
the name of "national security" turned out to have some serious repercussions.  The trend 
started to change when it was revealed that by invoking "national security" as a 
justification, the Executive Branch engaged in widespread spying on American citizens 
not working for foreign powers without first obtaining a warrant.   
 In Zweibon v. Mitchell, sixteen members of the Jewish Defense League ("JDL"), a 
domestic organization whose goals included opposing the Soviet Union's restrictive 
emigration policies for Soviet Jews, brought suit against the Attorney General and nine 
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") agents for conducting illegal electronic 
surveillance, claiming that the surveillances violated their rights under both Title III and 
the Fourth Amendment.26  The Attorney General claimed that the surveillance of the JDL 
was "essential to protect this nation and its citizens against hostile acts of a foreign power 
and to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the 
United States."27  The court held, after reviewing the historical policy grounds behind 
Executive-authorized surveillance and prior case law, that a "warrant must be obtained 
before a wiretap is installed on a domestic organization that is neither the agent of nor 
acting in collaboration with a foreign power, even if the surveillance is installed under 
                                                 
25 Id. at 605. 
26 516 F.2d 594, 605-06 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
27 Id. at 607. 
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presidential directive in the name of foreign intelligence gathering for protection of the 
national security."28  The court's decision criticized the decisions in Brown and Butenko 
for not giving sufficient weight to First and Fourth Amendment rights: "[A]bsent exigent 
circumstances, all warrantless electronic surveillance is unreasonable and therefore 
unconstitutional."29  The D.C. Circuit, with Zweibon, was the sole federal court in this 
time period to not recognize a broad warrant exception in the area of foreign intelligence 
surveillance. 
 Around the same time Zweibon was decided, the Executive Branch was 
entrenched in numerous scandals for surveillance under the guise of national security.  
The Watergate investigation uncovered evidence of widespread illegal wiretapping of 
citizens by the Nixon administration.30  In 1975-76, the Senate Select Committee to 
Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the "Church 
Committee") conducted an investigation of the United States intelligence agencies to 
determine the extent of alleged invasions of the privacy interests of U.S. citizens.31  The 
Church Committee uncovered the alarming truth that the CIA spied illegally on as many 
as seven thousand Americans throughout the 1960s and early 1970s in “Operation 
CHAOS”, including individuals involved in the peace movement, student activists, and 
                                                 
28 Id. at 614 (emphasis added). 
29 Id. 
30 Encyclopedia Americana, Watergate Affair, at http://ap.grolier.com/article?assetid=0411680-
00&templatename=/article/article.html.  
31 SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, 94TH CONG., FINAL REPORT WITH 
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE (2nd Sess. 1976), at 
http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/churchfinalreportIIa.htm. 
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black nationalists.32  The FBI's “COINTELPRO” program similarly authorized illegal 
wiretapping and harassment of dissenters and anti-war protesters.33   
  Each of these revelations exposed to Congress how the absence of a clear 
statutory or judicial standard led to widespread abuse of the warrant exception for foreign 
intelligence.   The president and other executive agencies conducted a great deal of 
warrantless electronic surveillance of individuals who were not associated in any way 
with a foreign power, did not pose a threat to national security, and were not suspected of 
being involved in criminal activity.  These findings compelled Congress to enact a statute 
code to definitively determine the limits of the Executive Branch in conducting 
intelligence surveillance.  In creating FISA, "Congress sought to accommodate and 
advance both the government's interest in pursuing legitimate intelligence activity and the 
individual's interest in freedom from improper government intrusion."34
 
B. Elements of FISA 
 FISA establishes that a court order must be obtained authorizing foreign 
intelligence electronic surveillance.35  FISA created a special court, the FISC, whose sole 
duty it is to hear these applications for surveillance.  The purpose in establishing such a 
specialized court was to create a panel of judicial experts who would come to understand 
the nature of foreign intelligence surveillance and the competing interests at work 
                                                 
32 Id. 
33 Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, The COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the FBI's Secret 
Wars Against Dissent in the United States (1990), at 
http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/cointel.htm. 
34 United States v. Cavanaugh, 807 F.2d 787, 789 (9th Cir. 1987). 
35 50 U.S.C. § 2511 et. seq.  The FISA was amended in 1994 to also allow its use for authorizing physical 
searches that fall under its definitions of foreign intelligence information. Pub. L. No. 103-359, 108 Stat. 
3444 (1994). This note, however, focuses mostly of the use of the FISA for electronic surveillance, not only 
because this is its principle use, but also because the Department of Justice appeal discussed herein is based 
on two applications for electronic surveillance.  
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therein.36  To obtain a surveillance order, a federal officer, having first obtained the 
Attorney General's approval, must submit an application to one of the FISC judges.  The 
application must detail: 
1. the identity of the target;37 
2. the information relied on by the government to demonstrate that the target 
is a "foreign power" or an "agent of a foreign power";38  
3. evidence that the place where the surveillance will occur is being used, or 
is about to be used by the foreign power or its agent;39 
4. the type of surveillance to be used; 40 
5. the minimization procedures to be employed;41 and 
6. certification by either the Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs or an executive branch official designated by the President that the 
information sought is "foreign intelligence information"42 and that the 
information cannot reasonably be obtained by normal investigative 
techniques.43 
 
Before issuing the order, the FISC judge must make specific findings that: 
1. there is probable cause to believe that the target of the electronic 
surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;44 and 
2. in the case of a United States person, or legal resident alien, that the target 
of surveillance is not being considered an agent of a foreign power solely 
upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the 
Constitution.45 
 
                                                 
36 S. Rep. No. 95-701, at 93 (1978), reprinted at 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 4044 ("[A] federal judge has 
lifetime tenure and could presumably develop an expertise in the field of foreign affairs if consistently 
[resorted] to for authorizations for foreign security wiretaps.") (Senator Wallop quoting Zweibon, 516 F.2d 
594, 644 n.138 (1975)).  
37 50 U.S.C.  § 1804(a)(3). 
38 Id. § 1804(a)(4)(A).  The statute defines "foreign power.”  Id. § 1801(a).  It also defines "agent of a 
foreign power.”  Id. § 1801(b). 
39 Id. § 1804(a)(4)(B). 
40 Id. § 1804(a)(8). 
41 Id. § 1804(a)(5). Minimization procedures are defined in § 1801(h)(1) as " specific procedures, which 
shall be adopted by the Attorney General, that are reasonably designed in light of the purpose and 
technique of the particular surveillance, to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the 
dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United States persons 
consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence 
information." 
42 Id. § 1804(a)(7)(E)(i).  
43 Id. § 1804(a)(7)(E)(ii). 
44 Id. § 1805(a)(3)(A). 
45 Id. 
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For surveillance of "U.S. persons,"46 the FISC judge must find probable cause that one of 
four conditions has been met: 
1. the target knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence activities on behalf of a 
foreign power which "may involve" a criminal law violation;  
2. the target knowingly engages in other secret intelligence activities on behalf of a 
foreign power under the direction of an intelligence network and his activities 
involve or are about to involve criminal violations; 
3. the target knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism or is preparing 
for such activities; or 
4. the target knowingly aids or abets another who acts in one of the above ways.47 
 
 The FISC consists of eleven U. S. District Court judges appointed by the Chief 
Justice of the United States, of whom no fewer than three must reside within twenty miles 
of the District of Columbia.48  FISA provides that government appeals of FISC decisions 
be made to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, consisting of three 
district or circuit judges, also appointed by the Chief Justice.49 As of June, 2002, the 
Court of Review had never met, nor had any appeal ever been lodged because the FISC 
had never rejected an application made by the government.  The Court of Review 
convened for the first time on September 9, 2002, to hear the DOJ’s appeal from the 
May, 2002 FISC ruling in Sealed Case.  
 The Patriot Act made several changes to FISA.  It permits FISC to approve a 
surveillance application when the government demonstrates that the collection of foreign 
intelligence information is "a significant purpose" of the investigation.50 The language of 
                                                 
46 FISA defines "U.S. persons" to mean "a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence, an unincorporated association a substantial number of members of which are citizens 
of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation which is 
incorporated in the United States, but does not include a corporation or an association which is a foreign 
power.” Id. § 1801(i). 
47 Id.  §1801(b)(2). 
48 Id. § 1803(a).  The number of judges was increased from seven to eleven by the Patriot Act.  Patriot Act, 
Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 208, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (2001). 
49 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b) (2002). 
50 Id. § 1804(a)(7)(B). 
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the statute previously read simply that the application certify that "the purpose" of the 
surveillance or search was to secure information on foreign intelligence.51  The Patriot 
Act also added section 1806(k) that allowed for the increased sharing of the intelligence 
information with "any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, 
national defense, or national security official in order to assist the official receiving that 
information in the performance of his official duties."52  This amendment expanded the 
power of these agencies and officers to consult, share information, and coordinate their 
efforts in order to more effectively work against foreign threats. The scope of these 
changes is at the heart of the Court of Review's ruling in Sealed Case.  
 Two main problems that have been present throughout the history of FISA 
resurfaced in this appeal to the Court of Review.  The first problem has existed since 
FISA's enactment and has come to be characterized by legal commentators and the media 
as "the wall." The wall, as characterized in the DOJ briefs, arose from the "false 
dichotomy" between criminal law enforcement purposes and foreign intelligence 
purposes of surveillance that the courts read into FISA.53  The second problem is the 
constitutionality of foreign intelligence surveillance.  FISA allows for a lower standard of 
procedural safeguards than Title III and other laws governing electronic surveillance 
conducted in typical domestic criminal investigations.  The Patriot Act's amendments to 
the language of the statute seem to further relax those procedural safeguards, thus FISA's 
constitutionality has again come under scrutiny.   
 
                                                 
51 Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (2001). 
52 50 U.S.C. § 403-5d (2002); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1804(k) (2002). 
53 Supplemental Brief for the United States at 8, In Re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. 
Rev. 2002) (No. 02-001), available at http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/092502sup.html. 
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Part II: The "False Dichotomy" and "The Wall"
  The Patriot Act's amendments to FISA expressly sanctioned consultation and 
coordination between intelligence and law enforcement officials.  These amendments 
were meant by Congress to specifically address the problem of separation between 
criminal and intelligence investigations – “the wall.”54   
In the joint hearings investigating the September 11th hijackings, a New York 
special agent of the FBI, who in 1999 began serving on the New York field office's 
"Usama Bin Laden case squad" criticized "the wall."  “The Wall, and implied, 
interpreted, created or assumed restrictions regarding it, prevented myself and other FBI 
Agents working a criminal case out of the New York Field Office from obtaining 
information from the Intelligence Community, regarding Khalid Al-Mihdar and Nawaf 
Al-Hazmi” (who later turned out to be two of the September 11th hijackers) because they 
were part of an open FBI intelligence case.55  The criminal investigators were told that 
they could not investigate or attempt to locate either individual, even though they were 
suspected to have met with a suspect connected to the attack against the USS Cole. 56  
Frustrated at being up against "the wall", the agent wrote in an August 29, 2001 email, 
"someday someone will die - and wall or not - the public will not understand why we 
were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain 'problems'."57  
Many saw this "wall" as directly contributing to our lack of preparedness for the events 
of September 11th. 
                                                 
54 Prepared Statement of a New York Special Agent before the United States Senate and the House of 
Representatives (Sept. 20, 2002), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/0209hrg/020920/fbi.pdf. “From 
my perspective, and in its broadest sense – ‘The Wall’ is an information barrier placed between elements of 
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 The DOJ argued to the Court of Review that the primary purpose test that created 
"the wall" was an illusion - a false dichotomy never intended by the statutory language of 
FISA.58  To analyze the strength of that argument, it is important to understand how "the 
wall" was built. 
 For a long period of time, the law did not precisely delineate the permissible 
scope of the warrant exception for foreign intelligence surveillance. Most federal courts, 
before the passage of FISA, recognized that the Executive Branch had wide discretion for 
warrantless electronic surveillance to collect counterintelligence information.  However, 
in United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 59 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals set a limit 
on the acceptable scope of the exception with its "primary purpose" test.  In Truong, the 
Attorney General authorized a massive surveillance of Truong Dinh Hung, a Vietnamese 
citizen who was known to be passing diplomatic cables and other classified papers of the 
United States government's dealings with Southeast Asia to North Vietnamese 
government officials.  In the case against him, Truong sought to suppress the evidence 
obtained from the surveillance as not comporting with the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment.  The court recognized that the Executive Branch does have the power to 
conduct electronic surveillance for the gathering of foreign intelligence, without first 
obtaining a warrant, but the power is not without limits. 
[B]ecause individual privacy interests are severely compromised any time 
the government conducts surveillance without prior judicial approval, this 
foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement must be carefully limited to those situations in which the 
interests of the Executive are paramount. . .  [T]he Executive should be 
excused from securing a warrant only when the surveillance is conducted 
"primarily" for foreign intelligence reasons. . . [O]nce surveillance 
becomes primarily a criminal investigation, the courts are entirely 
                                                 
58 DOJ Supp. Br. at 12, supra note 55. 
59 United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980). 
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competent to make the usual probable cause determination, and because, 
importantly, individual privacy interests come to the fore and government 
foreign policy concerns recede when the government is primarily 
attempting to form the basis for a criminal prosecution.60
 
The above excerpt is the origin of the dichotomy between a foreign intelligence purpose 
and a criminal prosecution purpose.  The court found that in the course of their 
surveillance of Truong, the DOJ's purpose switched from intelligence gathering to 
gathering evidence for use in a criminal prosecution and thus required a warrant to be 
legal.  The primary purpose test from Truong spells out that the Executive Branch should 
be excused from securing a warrant only when "the surveillance is conducted 'primarily' 
for foreign intelligence reasons."61  Targets must "receive the protection of the warrant 
requirement if the government is primarily attempting to put together a criminal 
prosecution."62  The court then rejected the government's argument that if the surveillance 
was in any small way directed at gathering foreign intelligence, they could ignore the 
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.63  The court also rejected the other extreme 
offered by defendants: a "sole purpose" test, wherein the sole purpose of the surveillance 
must be to obtain foreign intelligence.  The court found this an unacceptable standard 
because "almost all foreign intelligence investigations are in part criminal 
investigations."64   Thus, to fit within the foreign intelligence exception to the warrant 
requirement, the surveillance must have greater than a mere minor objective of gathering 
foreign intelligence information, but the surveillance need not be solely directed toward 
that objective.   
                                                 
60 Id. at 915. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 916. 
63 Id. at 915. 
64 Id. 
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  It is important to note that Truong involved electronic surveillance that was done 
prior to the passage of FISA.  The decision, however, was handed down by the Court of 
Appeals after FISA's passage.  This fact is significant, for despite the fact that FISA was 
not controlling law, Troung's "primary purpose" test shaped subsequent Executive, 
congressional and judicial interpretation of FISA.  The court in Truong was not 
completely hands-off with FISA, however, as the DOJ briefs in Sealed Case contend65 
and the Court of Review decision implies.66  The Troung court, in a footnote interpreting 
FISA's provisions, discusses the language of FISA's exception to warrant requirement:  
[T]he complexity of the [FISA] statute . . . suggests that the imposition of 
a warrant requirement, beyond the constitutional minimum described in 
this opinion, should be left to the intricate balancing performed in the 
course of the legislative process by Congress and the President.  The 
elaborate structure of the statute demonstrates that the political branches 
need great flexibility to reach the compromises and formulate the 
standards which will govern foreign intelligence surveillance.67   
 
The Truong court explicitly notes that one of the reasons deference should be given to the 
Executive in the area of foreign intelligence, and the reason the Executive should be 
allowed to operate outside the normal confines of the warrant requirement is that the 
judiciary, lacking foreign intelligence knowledge and expertise, is ill-equipped to review 
warrant applications in this area.  But, the court points to the statutory establishment of 
FISC as "creat[ing] a special group of judges who will develop expertise in this arcane 
area."68  This lengthy footnote makes clear that not only did the Truong court engage in 
statutory interpretation of FISA and contemplate its proper application in this decision, 
but it intended its decision to conform with FISA's "intricate balancing" in creating 
                                                 
65 DOJ Supp. Br. at 6-7, supra note 55. 
66 Sealed Case, 310 F.3d. at 726, 742, supra note 14. 
67 Truong, 629 F.2d at 915 n.4. 
68 Id. 
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requirements analogous to Fourth Amendment standards for the foreign intelligence 
arena.  While this is dicta, since FISA is not controlling law, this footnote still provides 
some legitimacy to the application of the Troung primary purpose test to later cases 
wherein FISA was controlling law.  In this respect, the idea from the DOJ and the Court 
of Review that the Truong precedent was mistakenly applied to FISA cases and 
Executive decisions is not entirely accurate.69
 The primary purpose test was further ingrained with subsequent circuit court 
opinions interpreting and applying FISA.  Reviewing the conviction of several alleged 
agents of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in United States v. Duggan ,70 
the Second Circuit stated that "[t]he requirement that foreign intelligence information be 
the primary objective of the surveillance is plain not only from the language of § 1802(b) 
but also from the requirements in § 1804 as to what the application must contain."71  The 
Duggan court then found that the purpose of the surveillance at issue was initially and 
thereafter to secure foreign intelligence information, and not directed towards criminal 
investigation or prosecution.  It further elaborated that 
[an] otherwise valid FISA surveillance is not tainted simply because the 
government can anticipate that the fruits of such surveillance may later be used, as 
allowed by § 1806(b), as evidence in a criminal trial . . . the fact that domestic law 
enforcement concerns may also have been implicated did not eliminate the 
government's ability to obtain a valid FISA order.72
 
Thus, as long as the predominant purpose throughout is gathering foreign intelligence, the 
government need not obtain a traditional warrant.   
                                                 
69 DOJ Supp. Br. at 9; see also Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 726. 
70 United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984).  
71 Id. at 77. 
72 Id. at 78. 
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 Relying explicitly on Duggan and Truong, the First Circuit acknowledged in 
United States v. Johnson, that “although evidence obtained under FISA subsequently may 
be used in criminal prosecutions,…the investigation of criminal activity cannot be the 
primary purpose of the surveillance…The act is not to be used as an end-run around the 
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of warrantless searches.”73  The court went on to find 
that there had been no "end-run" around the Fourth Amendment in the Johnson case. The 
court found that the government's inquiries were all directed to activities relating to the 
support of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in Northern Ireland. From 
inception to conclusion, the purpose of the surveillance remained to gather foreign 
intelligence.74   
 In leveling its destruction of the primary purpose test, the Court of Review in 
Sealed Case criticizes these decisions, declaring that “neither Duggan nor Johnson tied 
the ‘primary purpose test’ to actual statutory language.”75 The Court of Review calls into 
question whether the Duggan court accurately pinpointed the sections of FISA where the 
"requirement that foreign intelligence information be the primary objective of the 
surveillance is plain."76   The court also condemns the Johnson court for not more neatly 
tying its analysis of foreign intelligence purpose to the basic language of section 
1804(a)(7)(B) of FISA.77  The Court of Review chides these two circuit court decisions 
for relying too heavily upon the precedent in Truong and not upon the plain, unadorned 
language and the plain intent of the original language of section 1804(a)(7)(B): "that the 
                                                 
73 952 F.2d 565, 572 (1st Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted). 
74 Id. at 572-73. 
75 Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 726. 
76 Id. at 726-27 (quoting Duggan supra note 70, at 77). 
77 Id. at 727 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2000)). 
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purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information,"78 not the 
primary purpose, just the purpose.  This critique disregards the fact that Truong actually 
engages in interpretation of FISA. The critique is even more disturbing, in light of the 
congressional history behind the passage of FISA that both decisions cite:  
In constructing this framework, Congress gave close scrutiny to departures 
from those Fourth Amendment doctrines applicable in the criminal-
investigation context in order to ensure that the procedures established in 
[FISA] are reasonable in relation to legitimate foreign counterintelligence 
requirements and the protected rights of individuals.  Their reasonableness 
depends, in part, upon an assessment of the difficulties of investigating 
activities planned, directed, and supported from abroad by foreign 
intelligence services and foreign-based terrorist groups.  The differences 
between ordinary criminal investigations to gather evidence of specific 
crimes and foreign counterintelligence investigations to uncover and 
monitor clandestine activities have been taken into account.  Other factors 
include the international responsibilities of the United States, the duties of 
the Federal Government to the States in matters involving foreign 
terrorism, and the need to maintain the secrecy of lawful 
counterintelligence sources and methods.79  
 
This excerpt from the legislative history reveals that Congress intended to protect 
individuals from the government using the lower standards of FISA to obtain information 
that would normally have to be obtained under Title III procedures or normal warrant 
requirements.  If these courts glossed the statutory language of section 1804(a)(7)(B) in 
creating a primary purpose test, it only effectuated this legislative intent.   
 Ignoring this rationale, however, the Court of Review sides with the DOJ 
argument that the primary purpose test created a dichotomy that the statute never itself 
contemplated.  The Court of Review correctly notes that although these cases adopted 
what is a “false” dichotomy between criminal and intelligence investigations, they did so 
in the process of actually allowing the admission of evidence gained under FISA orders.  
                                                 
78 Id. at 726 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2000)). 
79 S. Rep. No. 95-701, at 14-15 (1978), 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973 (quoted in Duggan, 743 F.2d at 73; cited 
in Johnson, 952 F.2d at 572). 
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Therefore, the government had no need to challenge the existence of this dichotomy until 
now.80   
 Moreover, even if the statutory language of FISA did not create the dichotomy, 
the DOJ accepted the existence of such a dichotomy beginning sometime in the 1980s 
and specifically erected a "wall" with the adoption of new procedures in 1995.81 In a 
memorandum entitled "Procedures for Contacts Between the FBI and the Criminal 
Division Concerning Foreign Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence 
Investigations" ("1995 procedures") from then Attorney General, Janet Reno, the contacts 
between the FBI and the DOJ Criminal Division in cases where FISA surveillance was 
conducted were expressly restricted.82  The 1995 procedures inserted the DOJ’s Office of 
Intelligence Policy and Review ("OIPR") between the FBI and the Criminal Division as 
the intermediary for communication83 and limited the amount of consultation allowed 
between the Criminal Division and the FBI.   
The FBI will apprise the Criminal Division, on a timely basis, of 
information developed during the [foreign intelligence] investigation that 
relates to significant federal criminal activity. The Criminal Division may 
give guidance to the FBI aimed at preserving the option of a criminal 
prosecution … The Criminal Division shall not, however, instruct the FBI 
on the operation, continuation, or expansion of FISA electronic 
surveillance or physical searches. Additionally, the FBI and Criminal 
Division should ensure that advice intended to preserve the option of a 
criminal prosecution does not inadvertently result in either the fact or the 
appearance of the Criminal Division's directing or controlling the [foreign 
intelligence] investigation toward law enforcement objectives. 84
 
                                                 
80 Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 727. 
81 Id. at 727-28.  
82 Id. at 727. 
83 Memorandum from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal 
Division (July 19, 1995), Part A, Subsection 1, available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1995procs.html. 
84 Id. at Part A, Subsection 6. 
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It was the "directing or controlling" language that, according to the DOJ, was eventually 
read as requiring OIPR to act as a "wall" to stop the FBI from candidly communicating 
with the Criminal Division.85 The Court of Review’s decision notes that the Executive 
Branch itself has, "in an effort to conform to district court holdings, accepted the 
dichotomy it now contends is false."86   
 The DOJ offers an avenue to the Court of Review to discredit FISC's dependence 
on the primary purpose test: even if the primary purpose test was at one point in time a 
required part of FISA process, the passage of the Patriot Act eliminated that test and the 
resulting dichotomy.  The Court of Review, reviewing this argument, takes note of the 
history of the significant purpose amendment of the Patriot Act.  Originally, the 
Executive Branch specifically sought an amendment to section 1804(a)(7)(B) which 
would have changed the language from "that the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain 
foreign intelligence information", to "that a purpose of the surveillance. . . " and in this 
respect the government was seeking a minimal threshold for the use of FISA procedures.  
Congress, although seeing the need for an amendment to FISA's purpose requirement, 
declined to adopt this suggested broad language.  As the Court of Review notes, Congress 
"adopted language which it perceived as not giving the government quite the degree of 
modification it wanted."87  The Patriot Act instead added the word "significant" in front 
of "purpose."  The Court of Review, while reviewing floor statements on this 
amendment,88 views this as clearly establishing a threshold that is lower than primary 
purpose, while still more significant than a negligible purpose.  "There is simply no 
                                                 
85 Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 728; DOJ Supp. Br. at 10-11. 
86 Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 727. 
87 Id. at 732. 
88 Id. at 732-33.  
 - 21 - 
question, however, that Congress was keenly aware that this amendment relaxed a 
requirement that the government show that its primary purpose was other than criminal 
prosecution."89   
 Further, with the adoption of section 1806(k) as part of the Patriot Act, Congress 
offered approval of more cooperative consultations between law enforcement officers and 
foreign intelligence officials.90   The Court of Review rejects FISC's ruling on 1806(k) 
that is steadfast in asserting that law enforcement officers are still prevented from 
"directing or controlling" surveillances.91  The Court of Review perceives the 
amendment's added definition of "consult" in the language of 1806(k) as including 
"giving of advice."92  Further, the consultation and coordination that Congress explicitly 
allows for in the amendments nowhere suggests a limitation on who is to direct and 
control, and it "necessarily implies that either law enforcement officers or foreign 
intelligence officials could be taking the lead."93   
 The Court of Review agreed with the DOJ that the original FISA did not 
contemplate the 'false dichotomy,' between law enforcement investigations and foreign 
                                                 
89 Id. at 732. 
90 50 U.S.C. § 1806(k) (Coordination with Law Enforcement. 
 (1) Federal officers who conduct electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence  
 information under this title may consult with Federal law enforcement officers or law enforcement  
 personnel of a State or political subdivision of a State (including the chief executive officer of that 
 State or political subdivision who has the authority to appoint or direct the chief law enforcement 
 officer of that State or political subdivision) to coordinate efforts to investigate or protect  
 against— 
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent 
of a foreign power; 
(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power ; or 
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign 
power or by an agent of a foreign power. 
(2) Coordination authorized under paragraph (1) shall not preclude the certification required by 
section 104(a)(7)(B) or the entry of an order under section 105 [50 U.S.C. § 1805 
(2000)].). 
91 Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 733.   
92 Id. at 733-34. 
93 Id.  
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intelligence investigations that the primary purpose test created.  But, it observes that the 
Congress actually did contemplate the dichotomy when passing these Patriot Act 
coordination and purpose amendments.  Consideration of the primary purpose test framed 
the drafting of the amendments, and thus they must be read in relation to that test's 
dichotomy, making the dichotomy no longer a false one.94   
 Once it established that the Congress intended to abandon the primary purpose 
requirement, the Court of Review was still left with interpreting the equally troublesome 
language they left behind them - the "significant purpose" test.   The Court of Review 
provides a lengthy interpretation of the significant purpose amendment, replete with 
practical examples,95 to fill this void.  It rejects the DOJ argument that the surveillance is 
legitimate under the significant purpose test as long as there is at least a small semblance 
of foreign intelligence purpose, but also does not accept the amicus arguments for 
reinstating the threshold of the "primary purpose" test.  The court concluded that, "The 
addition of the word 'significant' to section 1804(a)(7)(B) imposed a requirement that the 
government have a measurable foreign intelligence purpose, other than just criminal 
prosecution of even foreign intelligence crimes."96  The court recognized that the 
amendments created somewhat of an analytical conundrum: 
On the one hand, Congress did not amend the definition of foreign 
intelligence information which . . . includes evidence of foreign 
intelligence crimes. On the other hand, Congress accepted the dichotomy 
between foreign intelligence and law enforcement by adopting the 
significant purpose test.  The better reading . . . excludes from the purpose 
                                                 
94 Id. at 735. 
95 Id. at 736 (“[O]rdinary crimes might be inextricably intertwined with foreign intelligence crimes…but 
the FISA process cannot be used as a device to investigate wholly unrelated ordinary crimes.”  The court 
then provides an illustrative example: “if a group of international terrorists were to engage in bank 
robberies in order to finance the manufacture of a bomb, evidence of the bank robbery should be treated 
just as evidence of the terrorist act itself.”). 
96  Id. at 734-35. 
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of gaining foreign intelligence information a sole objective of criminal 
prosecution.97
 
In practice, this new standard will not make much difference, because the DOJ will not 
have decided whether to prosecute when it first commences surveillance.  Regardless of 
practical concerns, the Court of Review finds it important to lay to rest where this 
significant purpose threshold actually lies: "So long as the government entertains a 
realistic option of dealing with the agent other than through criminal prosecution, it 
satisfies the significant purpose test."98  
 It is not clear whether the Court of Review's description of the "measurable 
foreign intelligence purpose" and the "sole objective" test will be any more effective than 
the defunct "primary purpose" test in guiding the district courts as to when a FISA search 
and seizure was legitimate.  The practical effect of the amendment on the district courts 
may be no effect at all.  Before the passage of the amendment, courts were more often 
than not allowing the FISA-obtained evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution by 
finding that the government had fulfilled the primary purpose test, now it will only be 
easier for the courts to make the same ruling.99  If ever a court finds this to be a closer 
question however, the Court of Review's proffered "measurable purpose" test only 
provides a new adjective to the analysis.   
 To summarize, the evolution of the purpose requirement of FISA can be viewed 
rather simply.  When FISA was first adopted, the language did not explicitly include a 
                                                 
97 Id. 
98 Id.  
99 See generally Johnson, 952 F.2d 565; United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), 
aff’d sub nom. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59; see also United States v. Falvay, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1313-14 
(E.D.N.Y. 1982) (“Evidence derived from warrantless foreign intelligence searches will be admissible in a 
criminal proceeding only so long as the primary purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign 
intelligence.”); United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075-76 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1010 
(1988); United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1464 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 937 (1988). 
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primary purpose test - it merely stated that “the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain 
foreign intelligence information".100  Then, the federal courts read a gloss on the statute, 
requiring that the government show that the surveillance was conducted for the primary 
purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence information, not primarily to gather evidence 
for a criminal prosecution.  This purpose was then abandoned by the Patriot Act's 
amendment to section 1804(a)(7)(B) in favor of the significant purpose test.   The 
decision of the Court of Review has added to the fury of adjectives, leaving the courts to 
figure out if the government has proven there to be a "measurable foreign intelligence 
purpose" behind FISA surveillance.     
 
Part III:  Is FISA, as Amended, Constitutional?  
 Before the Patriot Act, courts held that FISA represented a reasonable balance 
between the needs of the government in gathering national intelligence information and 
the rights of individuals under the Fourth Amendment.101  Because the governmental 
interest in gathering intelligence information is different from that of a criminal 
investigation, it has been held that the lower standard of probable cause needed for a 
FISA order passes constitutional muster, even though it does not meet the standard 
needed in a criminal investigation.102  The federal courts have also held that the 
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is satisfied by FISA103 and that the ex 
                                                 
100 See Patriot Act, supra note 53. 
101 See Cavanaugh, 807 F.2d at 790; Duggan, 743 F.2d at 73; Johnson, 952 F.2d at 575; Pelton, 835 F.2d at 
1075. 
102 Cavanaugh, 807 F.2d at 791. 
103 Id. . 
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parte, in camera review under section 1806(f) is constitutional in light of the 
circumstances.104
 The primary purpose test was previously the screen federal courts used to 
determine the constitutionality of a particular instance of foreign intelligence surveillance 
under Fourth Amendment standards.105  Having disposed of the primary purpose test in 
its opinion, the Court of Review was left to determine if FISA is still constitutionally 
consistent with Fourth Amendment requirements.   
 The Fourth Amendment imparts: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probably cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.106  
 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to impose three requisites: 
First, warrants must be issued by neutral, disinterested magistrates.  
Second, those seeking the warrant must demonstrate to the magistrate their 
probable cause to believe that "the evidence sought will aid in a particular 
apprehension or conviction" for a particular offense.  Finally, "warrants 
must particularly describe the 'things to be seized.'" as well as the place to 
be searched.107
 
 The amici argue that the statute, as amended, provides an unconstitutional "end-
run" around the Fourth Amendment,108 first because a FISA order is not analogous to a 
warrant within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and second because any 
government surveillance whose primary purpose is criminal prosecution of any crime is 
                                                 
104 United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 475-77 (9th Cir. 1987). 
105 NACDL Br. at 13. 
106 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
107 Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979) (internal citation omitted), cited in Sealed 
Case, 310 F.3d at 738. 
108 ACLU Br. At 8; NACDL Br. at 3. 
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per se unreasonable if not based on a warrant.109  In the lower court ruling, the FISC was 
concerned that the government could use a FISA order, if the primary purpose test was 
eliminated, as an improper substitute for a normal criminal warrant required for 
electronic surveillance under Title III.110  The Court of Review rejects that reasoning, 
relying on a Supreme Court opinion which indicates that with respect to even domestic 
national security intelligence (i.e. surveillance of citizen terrorists, such as Timothy 
McVeigh), Title III procedures are not constitutionally required.111  Nevertheless, the 
Court of Review follows the lead of the amici and engages in a comparison of Title III 
and FISA.  The court analogizes FISA to Title III to buttress its constitutional legitimacy.  
It declares that since Title III has been found consistent with the Fourth Amendment, and 
since "In many significant respects the two statutes are equivalent and in some FISA 
contains additional protections,"112 FISA must accordingly be constitutional as well. 
 In comparing the two laws it is crucial to first note that Title III and FISA differ in 
their proscribed probable cause standard.  Title III authorizes electronic surveillance if it 
determines that "there is a probable belief that an individual is committing, has 
committed, or is about to commit" a specified predicate offense.113  FISA mandates, 
instead, a showing of probable cause that the person subject to the surveillance is a 
                                                 
109 Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 737.   
110 In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 624 
(Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. 2002).  
111 Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 737 citing United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 
322 (1972).  One defendant in Keith was charged with the dynamite bombing of a CIA office.  The 
government asserted that, under the national security powers of the President, surveillance of the defendant 
was lawful, though conducted without prior judicial approval.  The Court found that the government’s 
security concerns did not justify departure from the Fourth Amendment requirement of judicial approval 
prior to a search or surveillance.  However, the Court recognized “that domestic security surveillance may 
involve different policy and practice considerations from the surveillance of ‘ordinary crime.’”  Keith at 
322.  And thus, the same type of procedures prescribed by Title III may not be required in this situation.  
Sealed Case at 737.  
112 Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 741. 
113 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2000). 
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foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, not that the person's activities are 
necessarily subversive.114  While Congress intended a lesser showing of probable cause 
for foreign intelligence surveillance than required for domestic electronic surveillance, it 
also established a safeguard to prevent the domestic spying incidents uncovered in the 
1970s.  Under the requirement that their must be probable cause to believe the target is 
acting "for or on behalf of a foreign power," FISA surveillance could not be authorized, 
for example:  
against an American reporter merely because he gathers information for 
publication in a newspaper, even if the information was classified by the 
Government.  Nor would it be authorized against a Government employee or 
former employee who reveals secrets to a reporter or in a book for the purpose of 
informing the American people.  This definition would not authorize surveillance 
of ethnic Americans who lawfully gather political information and perhaps even 
lawfully share it with the foreign government of their national origin.  It obviously 
would not apply to lawful activities to lobby, influence, or inform Members of 
Congress or the administration to take certain positions with respect to foreign or 
domestic concerns.  Nor would it apply to lawfully gathering of information 
prepatory to such lawful activities.115
 
FISA surveillance would also not be authorized against a target engaged in purely 
domestic terrorism because the government would not be able to show that the target is 
acting for or on behalf of a foreign power.  FISA is limited only to precisely defined, 
serious foreign threats to national security. 
 Title III and FISA both contain requirements of particularity comporting with the 
second required element of the Fourth Amendment.  Title III requires probable cause to 
believe that particular communications concerning the specified crime will be obtained 
through the electronic surveillance.116  FISA requires an intelligence officer to designate 
the type of foreign intelligence information being sought, and to certify that the 
                                                 
114 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2000). 
115 Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 738, citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, at 40 (1978). 
116 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(b) (2002). 
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information is indeed foreign intelligence information.117  When the target is a U.S. 
citizen, the FISC judge reviews the certification for clear error, which is different than a 
probable cause finding by the judge.118  But there are additional safeguards, including 
that the certification must be made by a national security officer (typically the FBI 
director) and approved by the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General.119  
Congress intended that this certification would "assure written accountability within the 
Executive Branch" and provide "an internal check on Executive Branch arbitrariness".120  
Additionally, FISC can require the government to submit further information as it deems 
necessary to determine whether the certification is erroneous.121   
 Title III generally requires probable cause to believe that the facilities subject to 
surveillance are being used or are about to be used in connection with commission of a 
crime or are leased to, listed in the name of, or used by the individual committing the 
crime.122  FISA requires probable cause to believe that each of the places under 
surveillance is being used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or agent.123  In cases 
where the premises are not leased to, listed in the name of, or used by the individual 
committing the crime, Title III requires the government to show a connection between the 
facilities and communications regarding the criminal offense.124  The court notes that, 
"FISA requires less of a nexus between the facility and the pertinent communications 
                                                 
117 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(E)(i) (2002). 
118 Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 739. 
119 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (2002). 
120 Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 739, citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, at 80 (1978). 
121 50 U.S.C. § 1804(d) (2002). 
122 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(d) (2002). 
123 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(B) (2002). 
124 Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 740. 
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than Title III, but more of a nexus between the target and the pertinent 
communications."125   
 Both statutes have a necessity requirement, which requires the court to find that 
the information sought is not available through normal investigation procedures, i.e. that 
electronic surveillance is necessary.126  The statutes have duration constraints.  Title III 
orders can last for thirty days,127 while FISA can last up to ninety days for United States 
persons.128  The allowance for a longer surveillance period is based on the nature of 
foreign intelligence surveillance, which is "often long range and involves the interrelation 
of various sources and types of information."129  The longer surveillance period is 
balanced by continuing oversight of minimization procedures by FISC during the period 
of surveillance.130  
 With a few exceptions that were not at issue in this particular decision, both Title 
III and FISA fulfill the first requirement of prior judicial authorization for electronic 
surveillance.131 A FISC judge qualifies as a neutral and detached magistrate132 and is an 
Article III judge. 
 The Court of Review resolves that although FISA and Title III are mostly parallel, 
FISA still does not constitute a warrant in the traditional constitutional sense, due to the 
different nature of probable cause showings and particularity requirements.133  The DOJ 
brief never claims that a FISA order is equivalent to a warrant, though there is case law in 
                                                 
125 Id. 
126 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(b) (2000); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(E)(ii), 1805(a)(5) (2002). 
127 Id. § 2518(5). 
128 50 U.S.C. § 1805(e)(1) (2002). 
129 Keith, 407 U.S. at 322. 
130 50 U.S.C. § 1805(e)(3) (2002). 
131 Id. § 1805; 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2000).   
132  Cavanaugh, 807 F.2d at 790.   
133 Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 741. 
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support of the point.134  The Court of Review declined to answer definitively whether a 
FISA order qualifies as a warrant within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, noting 
"that to the extent a FISA order comes close to meeting Title III, that certainly bears on 
its reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment."135  Here, the Court of Review seems to 
recognize the precarious ground it treads upon.  It is plain that FISA orders do not fit 
neatly into our traditional notions of Fourth Amendment warrants.  However, FISA does 
seem to fit the three requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  A FISA order is issued by a 
neutral, disinterested magistrate.  A FISA order does involve showings of probable cause.  
Also, FISA does have particularity requirements.   The fact that FISA provides 
replacements for Title III procedures makes it seem equally safeguarded against 
infringement upon liberties. The Court of Review's holding that a FISA order "comes 
close" to a warrant is persuasive.   However, in declaring that FISA's procedural steps 
display its reasonableness, the Court of Review may do little to calm the fears civil 
libertarians who have seen the results of DOJ oversight, which allowed for false or 
misleading information in FISA applications,136 and the ineffective check on DOJ 
misconduct that has been provided by the FISC "rubberstamp" court.137     
 The amici briefs from the NACDL and the ACLU focus on the lack of notice in 
FISA to challenge its constitutionality.138  Title III requires notice to the target of 
surveillance once the surveillance order expires,139 while FISA does not.  The amici also 
stress that Title III entitles a defendant to obtain the surveillance application and order to 
                                                 
134 Id. at 741-42, citing Cavanaugh, 807 F.2d at 790; United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 
1978); United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1314. 
135 Id. at 742. 
136 See supra note 12. 
137 See supra notes 10, 11. 
138 NACDL Br. at 8-10; ACLU Br. at 5-6. 
139 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (2000). 
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challenge the legality of the surveillance.140  FISA does not normally allow a defendant to 
see the surveillance application or order if the Attorney General states that disclosure or 
an adversary hearing would harm national security,141 which is normally called for in 
such cases.  If the Attorney General makes such a statement, the judge then conducts an 
in camera and ex parte review to determine if the electronic surveillance was lawful, 
whether disclosure and discovery is necessary, and whether to grant a suppression 
motion.142  The Court of Review avoided answering the constitutionality of this issue, 
citing that the "decision whether to allow a defendant to obtain FISA materials is made 
by a district judge on a case by case basis, and the issue whether such a decision protects 
a defendant's constitutional rights in any given case is not before us."143 The Court of 
Review was wise to not decide this issue in this case.  The controversy in front of them 
deals only with the approval or denial of FISA applications, not the question of whether 
evidence obtained under a particular FISA application is admissible.  To make a ruling on 
this issue, as the ACLU and NACDL briefs asked, would have undermined the 
legitimacy of this ruling by over-stepping the particular "case and controversy" in front of 
them. 
 The DOJ, recognizing that FISA represents a departure from traditional Fourth 
Amendment standards, urges the Court of Review to place foreign intelligence 
surveillance within the Supreme Court's "special needs" doctrine that justifies lower 
Fourth Amendment standards.144  Under the special needs cases, the Supreme Court 
                                                 
140 Id. § 2518(9). 
141 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (2002). 
142 Id. §§ 1806(f),(g). 
143 Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 741 n. 24. 
144 Brief for the United States at 33-34, In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. 
Rev. 2002), available at http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/082102appeal.html [hereinafter DOJ Br.]. 
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established that under exceptional circumstances the need to search often outweighs 
liberty interests and a strict application of Fourth Amendment requirements are not 
needed.145  The doctrine which was developed in the areas of public school drug searches 
and random, suspicionless stop and search programs, is not easily applicable to the 
context of foreign intelligence surveillance.   
 Both the DOJ and the amici use the recent standard set by City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond146 to support their respective arguments regarding application of the special 
needs doctrine.  In Edmond, the Supreme Court held that a highway checkpoint designed 
to catch drug dealers did not fit within the special needs exception because the 
government's main objective was "to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal 
wrongdoing."147  The Court rejected the government's argument that the serious nature of 
the drug problem was sufficient to overcome the need for individualized suspicion.148  
Amici cite Edmond for the proposition that "the gravity of the threat alone cannot be 
dispositive of questions concerning what means law enforcement officers may employ to 
pursue a given purpose."149 The Court of Review agrees that while the threat to society is 
not dispositive, it "remains a crucial factor, [for] our case may well involve the most 
serious threat our country faces."150   
 The DOJ finds Edmond persuasive in its argument that "while the general interest 
in crime control does not justify a departure from ordinary Fourth Amendment standards, 
                                                 
145 See Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Action, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (Random drug-testing of student athletes 
permitted under the special needs doctrine); Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) 
(State sobriety checkpoints not a Fourth Amendment violation under special needs); United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (Checkpoints for border control allowable under special needs). 
146 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
147 Id. at 41-42. 
148 Id. at 42. 
149 Id. 
150 Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 746. 
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a 'special' interest concerning a particular type of crime may do so."151  The Court of 
Review finds the DOJ's use of the Edmond precedent persuasive, holding that "the Court 
distinguished general crime control programs and those that have another particular 
purpose."152  Warrantless searches and seizures have been allowed in special needs cases 
because the government interests involved "unique interests beyond ordinary, general law 
enforcement . . . The distinction between ordinary criminal prosecutions and 
extraordinary situations underlies the Supreme Court's approval of entirely warrantless 
and even suspicionless searches that are designed to serve the government's 'special 
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.'"153  The Court of Review is swayed 
by the fact that "[t]he government's concern with respect to foreign intelligence crimes . . 
. is overwhelmingly to stop or frustrate the immediate criminal activity."154  And the 
Court of Review finds it significant to note, "The Court [in Edmond] specifically 
acknowledged that an appropriately tailored road block could be used 'to thwart an 
imminent terrorist attack.' The nature of the 'emergency,' which is simply another word 
for threat, takes the matter out of the realm of ordinary crime control."155  The Court of 
Review finds that foreign intelligence surveillance is beyond normal, ordinary law 
enforcement interests and fits into the special needs exception.  It comes to this holding 
by ultimately relying on our fears in post-September 11th America, "After the events of 
September 11, 2001 . . . it is hard to imagine greater emergencies facing Americans than 
those experienced on that date."156  
                                                 
151 DOJ Br. at 33. 
152 Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 745. 
153 Id., citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653. 
154 Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 744. 
155 Id. at 746, quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44. 
156 Id.  
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 To play upon the fears of a terrorist threat as the ultimate support for their holding 
undermines the strength of the Court of Review's opinion.  The special needs doctrine 
was developed in the areas public school drug searches and random, suspicionless stop 
and search programs.  The public school setting involves the Fourth Amendment rights of 
minors, who traditionally do not hold full civil liberty interests under our Constitution, 
especially considering the in loco parentis relationship associated with public schools. 
The stop and search programs involve an area where the common law has already 
developed a strong automobile exception to Fourth Amendment search and seizure 
requirements.  Further, both areas where special needs apply involve physical searches, 
not electronic surveillance, to which even the Court of Review admits: "wiretapping is a 
good deal more intrusive than an automobile stop accompanied by questioning."157  To 
rely on the threat of terrorism plays right into the voiced fears of the ACLU, that civil 
rights and liberties are often eroded in the name of national security.158  The Court of 
Review's decision would have more legitimacy had it not feebly analogized to the special 
needs doctrine, but instead relied more strongly upon the "unreasonable searches and 
seizures" language in the Fourth Amendment.  The Court should have focused upon a 
simple balancing test of the government's reasonable need weighed against a citizen's 
liberty as protected by procedural FISA safeguards that are parallel to warrant 
requirements.  The stronger need sometimes outweighs the strength of an individual's 
liberty interest.   
                                                 
157 Id.  
158 ACLU Br. at 38-39.  See also ACLU, Insatiable Appetite: The Government’s Demand for New and 
Unnecessary Powers After September 11, available at http://archive.aclu.org/congress/Insatiable 
Appetite.pdf.  
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 The Court of Review concludes that FISA is constitutional because the 
surveillances it authorizes are reasonable.159  FISA's procedures approach a classic 
warrant requirement.  FISA seems reasonable because it is close to the requirements for 
electronic surveillance for criminal investigations in Title III.160   Foreign intelligence 
surveillance is also analogous to the Supreme Court's line of decisions establishing 
special needs doctrine.161  The Court of Review admits, however, that their analogies can 
only shed so much light on this problem, remarking: "the procedures and government 
showings under FISA, if they do not meet the minimum Fourth Amendment warrant 
standards, certainly come close."162  Thus, the Court of Review's decision amounts to a 
tentative answer as to whether FISA is actually constitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment's requirements or just "close" enough. 
 
Part IV: Conclusion 
 The Court of Review's decision attempts to resolve two contentious issues 
surrounding FISA and in doing so, provides the first analysis of the relevant Patriot Act 
amendments.  They interpret the "significant purpose" language of the amendment to 
imply something less than that required under the previous "primary purpose" standard, 
but still some "measurable" purpose.  It will now lie with the district courts and FISC to 
determine what measures as significant.  It may not matter, practically speaking, that the 
standard has changed.  District courts, before the amendment, were more often than not 
affirming FISA searches and seizures under the stricter "primary purpose" standard.  The 
                                                 
159 Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 742, 746. 
160 Id. at 742. 
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effect of lowering the standard will likely have no consequence on the trend of these 
rulings.   
 The FISC, however, seems to have embarked on a trend, rebuking its former 
"rubberstamping" identity toward a more pro-active review of FISA applications, which 
may demonstrate to those concerned for the status of civil liberties in a post 9/11 America 
that the system does work.  We may hear more from this court, in the future, in the way 
of denials of DOJ applications.  At any rate, from an outsider's point of view, it seems as 
if the original congressional purpose of creating an expert panel to review these 
specialized surveillance requests has been fulfilled.  The FISC does not always defer to 
the expertise of the Executive Branch.  It does indeed have a mind of its own. 
 The Court of Review in its reexamination of the constitutionality of FISA, in light 
of the Patriot Act changes, ultimately “hung its hat” on public concerns over the threat of 
terrorism in finding FISA analogous to traditional Fourth Amendment requirements. 
Most federal courts which have a chance to review this issue in the future will also use 
this threat persuasive.  Using this rationale to grant FISA surveillance legitimacy does not 
differ much from the rationale used prior to 1978 justifying the broader foreign 
intelligence exception to the warrant requirement that existed before FISA.  In the end, 
with or without FISA, and with or without a primary or significant purpose test, there will 
always be a struggle between civil liberty interests and the interests of national security.  
So, though Sealed Case has added some guidance, it has not quelled the debate. 
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